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## Over Stretch

#### An exponential increase in targeted killings is coming in the status quo- Obama's recent speech broadens the target spectrum for drones

Lesley Clark and Jonathan S. Landay May 23, 2013"Obama speech suggests possible expansion of drone killings" http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html She arrived in Washington in 2006 as a regional reporter for the Miami Herald, and later the Bradenton Herald as well. She was assigned to cover the White House in July 2011. onathan S. Landay, senior national security and intelligence correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, has written about foreign affairs and U.S. defense, intelligence and foreign policies for more than 25 years.

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama on Thursday defended his administration’s use of drone strikes to kill terrorists as effective, lawful and “heavily constrained,” but he also appeared to be laying groundwork for an expansion of the controversial targeted killings. In remarks at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama cast the use of such operations as a necessary part of an overall national defense strategy, even as he acknowledged targeted killings risk “creating new enemies” and could “lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.” He said the U.S. is at a crossroads of national security issues with a diffuse array of terrorist threats that require a recasting of a war on terror. “Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror,” Obama said, contending that the threat of large-scale attacks like the Sept. 11 2001, terrorist attacks has faded as al Qaida has been weakened, but that threats like the Boston Marathon bombing and attacks in Benghazi remain. “What we can do – what we must do – is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” As part of that, he renewed a first term campaign promise to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, announcing that he’d lift a ban on detainee transfers to Yemen – homeland of half of the 166 captives at the detention facility. The speech served to counter critics who say the drone program has been bathed in secrecy, as Obama offered more details on when the U.S. will deploy drone strikes. But Obama’s speech appeared to expand those who are targeted in drone strikes and other undisclosed “lethal actions” in apparent anticipation of an overhaul of the 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against al Qaida and allied groups that supported the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In every previous speech, interview and congressional testimony, Obama and his top aides have said that drone strikes are restricted to killing confirmed “senior operational leaders of al Qaida and associated forces” plotting imminent violent attacks against the United States. But Obama dropped that wording Thursday, making no reference at all to senior operational leaders. While saying that the United States is at war with al Qaida and its associated forces, he used a variety of descriptions of potential targets, from “those who want to kill us” and “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat” to “all potential terrorist targets.” The previous wording also was absent from a fact sheet distributed by the White House. Targeted killings outside of “areas of active hostilities,” it said, could be used against “a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks.” The preconditions for targeted killings set out by Obama and the fact sheet appear to correspond to the findings of a McClatchy review published in April of U.S. intelligence reports that showed the CIA killed hundreds of lower-level suspected Afghan, Pakistani and unidentified “other” militants in scores of drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal are during the height of the operations in 2010-11. Nearly 4,000 people are estimated to have died in U.S. drone strikes since 2004, the vast majority if them conducted by the CIA in Pakistan’s tribal area bordering Afghanistan. The fact sheet also said that those who can be killed must pose a “continuing and imminent threat” to “U.S. persons,” setting no geographic limits. Previous administration statements have referred to imminent threats to the United States – the homeland or its interests. “They appear to be broadening the potential target set,” said Christopher Swift, an international legal expert who teaches national security studies at Georgetown University and closely follows the targeted killing issue. At the same time, new presidential guidance on targeted killings that Obama signed Wednesday appeared designed to address charges by some legal scholars and civil and human rights groups that the administration has relied on an overly broad definition of “imminent” that exceeds the international legal standard. In his speech, Obama introduced the phrase “continuing and imminent” in what Swift saw as an effort to better define when the U.S. government can use lethal force. “The standard for the use of force appears to be narrowing because they’ve introduced the standard of imminent and continuing,” Swift said. “Imminent means that the threat poses clear, credible and immediate risk of violence.” Swift said he still has serious problems with the administration’s criteria for targeted killing because it has yet to publicly identify beyond the Afghan Taliban and al Qaida’s regional affiliates the groups that it considers “associated forces” of the terrorist network and the criteria it uses to define them. Several other experts said they also remained troubled because Obama continued to keep secret details of the procedures that the administration uses in deciding who can be targeted in drone strikes and other lethal operations off traditional battlefields. “I don’t think anyone should feel reassured by anything that President Obama said about the use of lethal force,” said Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International. The speech came as the administration has been rattled by a series of controversies, and Obama sought to stem growing criticism of the drone program from members of Congress and civil and human rights groups that charge it’s killed hundreds of civilians and violates U.S. and international law. Obama said the guidelines he signed Wednesday include working with other countries and only using strikes when the U.S. – or other governments – do not have the ability to capture terrorists. He said the U.S. preference is to detain and prosecute, and that drone strikes are not used as “punishment” but to prevent attacks waged by terrorists who pose a “continuing and imminent threat to the American people.”

#### Targeted Killling deconstruct the norms of warfare- 3 warrants

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights.

This new, high-tech weaponry disrupts many of our traditional expectations about warfare. Gone are long-established ideas about the place or time of combat. Gone too is the traditional idea of the combatant. The drone targets a particular individual, not a class or category of combatants. The victim is targeted for what he has done or is planning to do, not for his status. A person identified in this way has been eliminated; he may have been targeted while he was engaging in the most ordinary activities of private life. The drone is the technological equivalent of the assassin, but without the risk of personal presence.4 That absence means that the drone operates in a zone of asymmetrical violence. The operator kills, but is so removed from battle that he is unlikely even to think of himself as a combatant. He may work a desk job in an office building in an American suburb. Cumulatively, these three categories of disturbance canvas the basic elements of the political imaginary of warfare. Borrowing from Kant, we can call the first category the “aesthetics” of warfare: the spatial and temporal frame of the experience. We can call the second, the subjectivity of the combatant: is the combatant an individual or a corporate subject? The third category is that of the internal morality of combat. Traditionally, combat established a relationship of reciprocal risk – killing was linked to a willingness to be killed. Does the combatant’s privilege of killing depend upon some such reciprocity? At issue in these three categories are the where, the who, and the ethos of political violence. These categories locate us in a common world of meaning. Responding to these categories one way located us in world of warfare; answering them another way located us in a world of law enforcement. Each has been its own world. These worlds, however, are intersecting in contemporary conflicts. One consequence of that intersection is that we don’t know what body of law to apply: international humanitarian law or criminal procedure. Each of these dimensions – the aesthetics, subjectivity, and ethos of combat – must be investigated. That is a large task that can only be sketched here. The problem we confront is not the absence of norms with respect to violence, but rather a surfeit of norms that are not well ordered with respect to each other. There is not one right way to kill and be killed for the sake of political ends. Elsewhere and at other times practices have been different. We can only proceed by examining our own political imaginary as it constructs an image of the ends and means of responding to violence.

#### Allowing these norms to collapse situates the political imaginary of asymmetrical states towards policing and away from sovereignty- war dictates politics instead of the other way around

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights

There is a banal question that the United States often faces with respect to military deployments around the world. Who, we are asked, made you the policeman to the world? The answer is no one. Communities should be free to make their law for themselves and to struggle with issues of enforcement. The history of nations is not a story of progress, but of struggle. If we believe that national politics is of value, then it is their struggle. We are remarkably obtuse to the lessons of our own history, if we fail to recognize this. What if Britain, prior to the Civil War, had invaded the United States in order to end the practice of slavery? Despite the justice of the end, would the nation have united in resistance? As I argued above, every war can become one of self-defense. Of course, as with any principle, there are exceptions. Nevertheless, our own practices suggest how narrow they are.81 Acknowledging that we are not the world’s policeman, however, does not answer the question of whether we can or should deploy violence abroad. The United States has been more than willing to go to war against its enemies. Indeed, America has been at war or preparing for war for most of the last 100 years. War is not to be explained in terms of justice – the end of law – but in terms of existence. It is the response to the perception of an existential challenge to the popular sovereign. As long as such threats are imagined, war will shape our politics. War and law enforcement are not just formal categories. They refer to structures of the political imaginary before they refer to structures of law. I have tried to delineate the basic categories through which this framing takes place: the aesthetics of war, the subjectivity of the combatant, and the ethos of war. Together, these elements produce a picture of what war is, what it is about, and what norms should govern it. Today, however, we are in an uncertain time. The old pattern of war between sovereign states is breaking apart in the face of new threats. The different elements no longer exist in relationships of mutual support. The balance among the technology of violence, the politics of war, and our normative understanding of the character of the practice no longer holds. Political violence is no longer between states with roughly symmetrical capacities to injure each other; violence no longer occurs on a battlefield between masses of faceless combatants; and those involved no longer seem morally innocent. The drone is both a symbol and a part of the dynamic destruction of what had been a stable imaginative structure. It captures all of these changes: the enemy is not a state, the target is not innocent, the engagement occurs in a normalized time and space, and there is no reciprocity of risk. We can call this situation “war,” but it is no longer clear exactly what that means. If terrorism is with us to stay, we are going to have to have to move beyond criminal or enemy. The confrontation with terror will evolve its own norms, borrowing from the traditional categories of both law enforcement and war. We will need to imagine violence organized around forms of administrative rationality. This is something we have been reluctant to do, given the history of administrative death in the 20th century. Perhaps this time the need will make us more responsive to international institutions than our practice of sacrifice of the corporate body. We simply don’t know. We cannot know, for it is not up to us alone. The terrorist who is presently neither criminal nor enemy will have a good deal to say about this.

#### The paradigm shift destroys the legal distinction between criminal and enemy

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This relationship of representation to identity provides the fundamental structures of the modern political imagination.16 Unless we keep both dimensions of the modern state in mind, we will be at a loss to understand its deeply paradoxical character. The state promised individual well-being under the rule of law, but it also made a total claim on the lives and property within its jurisdiction. The Hobbesian sovereign ended one state of nature only to establish another. The war of individuals ended, while that of states began. It is not at all clear which should be thought of as the more dangerous condition: to be murdered in the state of nature or to die for one’s country. The state was simultaneously the vehicle for peace and war, for life and death. The logic of law pointed to individual well-being as the ground of legitimacy, while sovereign presence depended upon citizens willing to sacrifice themselves. The modern state has been this curious combination of well-being and sacrifice. We hear echoes of this duality today when the American war on terror is simultaneously criticized for its failure to comply with law and for its failure to call on the entire population to share in sacrifice. Political identity in the modern state has been a negotiation of these basic categories. The double character of the state as both an inward order and an outward threat is seen in the multiple pairings of our basic political concepts: law and sovereignty, peace and war, well-being and sacrifice. Carl Schmitt was standing within this tradition when he identified the friend/enemy distinction as the defining political conception.17 That pairing, however, is no more basic than any of the others, including criminal and enemy.

#### That distinction is key to the legitimacy of the state- absent concrete political definitions war and intervention become endless bouts of militarism.

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights.

Criminal or enemy made literally a world of difference. Entire bodies of law, substantive and procedural, turned on this distinction. More important, our understanding of ourselves – who we are and what we are doing – continues to turn on it.5 Are we defending the state or enforcing the law? Are we killing the enemy or punishing the criminal? Despite the importance of the distinction, there is no formal check list and no single characteristic by which we can determine whether the object of our violence is criminal or enemy. We are long past the time when the declaration of war might have marked the difference.6 We cannot even confidently rely on the presence of the military to tell us that we confront the enemy.7 Especially in a democracy, the question is one of perception: do we see a criminal act or an act of war? Before there is legal distinction, there is an act of the imagination. Getting this distinction right, then, has less to do with law than with popular perception. It is a political decision – some might say the political decision.8 A government that sees criminals where the populace sees the enemy will be judged ineffective or weak. If it sees enemies where the populace sees criminals, it will be judged illegitimate and authoritarian. Governments, of course, are not merely passive in this regard. They try to shape public opinion, but they do not control it. Criminal and enemy amount to different, even opposing, ways of ordering elements within what Clifford Geertz called “webs of significance.”9 Those elements range across the three categories of aesthetics, subjectivity, and ethos. All of these factors are related through habits of thought and perception; all of them are contestable, for we deal here with matters of interpretation. A change in any one factor can lead to a different weighting of the others. Where we once saw an enemy, we may come to see a criminal – and vice versa. Max Weber can help us to begin to frame the inquiry as one that juxtaposes law to sovereignty, which will in turn provide the broad foundation for the distinction of the criminal from the enemy. Weber famously defined the state as a community that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territorial jurisdiction.10 His definition drew on several centuries of imaginative political framing, beginning with Hobbes’s idea of exit from the state of nature. The state of nature is precisely the situation in which there is no successful monopoly on violence. Without that, individuals and groups may be stronger or weaker, they may win or lose over some period of time, but they constantly confront the explicit or implicit threat of violence from others. Only a common belief in legitimacy brings stability.

#### Micro militarism and hot spot management is the kiss of death for unipolar hegemons and accelerates the collapse.

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power. Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200 ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and [extended its commitment](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175324/tomgram%3A_engelhardt%2C_general_petraeus%27s_two_campaigns/) to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.

#### **The decline of American power creates transnational corporations and multilateral forces degrading the earth to urban and rural wastelands with feral failed cities littered with explosions and suicide bombers.**

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

As U.S. power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the U.S. In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single, possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While denationalized corporations and multinational elites would assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands. In “Planet of Slums,” Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision of such a world from the bottom up. He argues that the billion people already packed into fetid favela-style slums worldwide (rising to two billion by 2030) will make “the ‘feral, failed cities’ of the Third World… the distinctive battlespace of the twenty-first century.” As darkness settles over some future super-favela, “the empire can deploy Orwellian technologies of repression” as “hornet-like helicopter gun-ships stalk enigmatic enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts… Every morning the slums reply with suicide bombers and eloquent explosions.”

#### **Targeted Killing blurs the lines of war and peace- creates endless warfare and intervention.**

Kitfield ’13 Updated: February 3, 2013 | 9:29 a.m.  January 31, 2013 | 8:20 p.m. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/targeted-killings-obama-s-endless-war-20130131> James Kitfield has written on defense, national security and foreign policy issues from Washington, D.C. for over two decades. He is a three-time winner of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, most recently in 2009 for his first-hand reporting on the Afghan War and other ongoing conflicts and threats. He has twice won the Military Reporters and Editors Association award and the Medill School of Journalism’s top prize for excellence in reporting for his first hand coverage of the war in Afghanistan (2009) and the surge in Iraq (2008). He is a recipient of the 2002 Stewart Alsop Media Excellence Award, sponsored by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, for his coverage of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and follow-on events. He received the 2001 Peter R. Weitz Prize from the German Marshall Fund for excellence in reporting on European affairs, and the 2000 Edwin Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence given annually by the National Press Club to recognize excellence in reporting on diplomatic and foreign policy issues

A more transparent debate about the program at Brennan’s confirmation hearings is also likely to highlight just how dramatically a decade of war has transformed America. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials routinely criticized Israel for its targeted-assassination program aimed at Palestinian terrorists. Today, deadly strikes by armed robotic drones are so routine that the media give them only passing mention. The U.S. targeted killing program also enjoys support from a majority of the public and from a relatively compliant Congress.¶ As the government has honed the ability to eliminate enemies of the state in a clandestine war without end, however, the once clear lines between all-out warfare and peacetime law enforcement continue to fade. Some Al-Qaida suspects are granted Miranda rights and charged in federal courts, while others are kept in military prisons and prosecuted by military commissions or simply held indefinitely. Still others are eviscerated far from any acknowledged battlefield by an executive branch that claims the authority to act as judge, jury, and executioner. In a nation in a state of perpetual conflict, the danger is that those lines between war and peace will continue to blur until Americans have forgotten the difference.

## Credibility

#### Obama has a unique opportunity to revive American soft power in his second term but the plan is key

Hayes 2012 (Nick Hayes, professor of history who holds the university chair in critical thinking at Saint John's University, December 3, 2012, Minnesota Post, http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2012/12/troubling-questions-about-obama-s-drone-warfare)

My last post argued that, in the wake of his election victory and on the eve of his second term, President Obama stands at what could be his “Truman moment” as a “post war” president. More than a decade of war consumed the two terms of the Bush administration and Obama’s first term. He now faces an historic opportunity to articulate the doctrine and design the framework for an imperfect but lasting peace.

The post stirred up quite of reaction of a number of you. Some readers trashed my interpretation of the past and the present. One reader remembered that long, long ago, I was an aspiring poet and pacifist.

Several readers took me to task for not mentioning Obama’s third war. He has withdrawn from one conventional war in Iraq and promised to complete the withdrawal from the second -- the war in Afghanistan -- by the end of 2014. He is not relenting from a third, highly unconventional war: U.S. drone warfare against suspected terrorist targets in the Middle East and South Asia.

The drone warfare campaign threatens to cost the president much of his political capital abroad. Last week, the PEW Global Attitudes Project released a report with mixed news for Obama. The good news confirmed that world public opinion cheered Obama’s victory over Mitt Romney in the election. The bad news lay in the increasing and widespread disapproval of his foreign policy in general, and especially his use of drone attacks.

World criticism

Criticism of Obama’s drone warfare campaign stands at 80 percent in Egypt, Turkey and Jordan; 75 percent in Spain and Japan; 63 percent in France, and 59 percent in Germany. His personal popularity gives Obama valuable political capital abroad that he should spend wisely to build support for his diplomatic initiatives, especially in the Middle East, and not waste it to vindicate drone warfare that generates more enemies than it kills.

#### Drones now tank US cred—no oversight

Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65, January 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736>, pg15)

The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are covert is that both the American and international publics often misunderstand how drones are used. And in affected states, citizens often blame the United States for collateral damage that could have been caused by the host states’ own weapon systems. According to a recent report from Yemen: It’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for any given strike. . . . It could be a manned plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the U.S. military. Or it could be an unmanned drone flown by the U.S. military or the CIA. . . . But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials acknowledge.37 Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly ten years of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any aspect of them.

#### **Generic Soft-Power defense doesn't apply, The US’s new role in global public health means that it has to take different steps to get people on board**

Kickbush ’02 Influence And Opportunity: Reflections On The U.S. Role In Global Public Health¶ [Ilona Kickbusch](http://content.healthaffairs.org/search?author1=Ilona+Kickbusch&sortspec=date&submit=Submit) doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.21.6.131¶ Health Aff November 2002 vol. 21 no. 6 131-141http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/21/6/131.long lona Kickbusch is head of the Division of Global Health at the Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health. From 1994 to 1998 she was director of communication at the World Health Organization in Geneva

Building a soft-power leadership role.¶ What could be the first steps in building a soft-power leadership role for the United States, taking into account its tendency toward global unilateralism within the administration and political system, on the one hand, and the collective intentionality for recognizing health as a global public good in the nongovernmental community, on the other? It is not helpful to give a long list of “shoulds,” ranging from financial contributions to world agreements, when what is needed is a change in mindset.¶ A first step would be to initiate a truly high-profile public debate on America’s role in global health that gives voice to the many actors, including government, NGOs, the private sector, universities, foundations, the media, and professional organizations. Such a debate would include a series of public hearings on the issues of equity, trade, access to drugs, governance mechanisms, financing global public goods, and the like, thus moving the agenda beyond disease control. It would therefore need not only to be a dialogue of health experts but also to include foreign policy, security, and other policy arenas of relevance.¶ Such a dialogue would go far beyond analyzing the U.S. role in international health agencies and beyond the financial contributions it makes either in multilateral or bilateral actions. It would focus in a much broader fashion on how the United States as a whole—its government, its private sector, its NGOs and foundations, its academic institutions, and its citizens—contributes to and is affected by the global distribution of health and disease. It would take global health from a technical focus into the political arena and identify the political choices that are at stake as well as priority responses.

#### Specifically its key to deal with pandemics and climate change.

Joseph S. Nye, pub. date: 2-16-07, former assistant secretary of defense and president of Harvard's Kennedy school of government, “The long view on China, political Islam and American power,” Financial Times, Lexis Nexis

The third determinant will be American power and how it is used. The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but the paradox is that the strongest state since Rome will not be able to protect its citizens acting alone. The US's military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism and international crime. These issues require cooperation and the soft power of attracting support. Defeating Islamist terrorism, for example, requires international intelligence and police co-operation, as well as drying up the sources of radical recruits. While hard military power will remain crucial for deterrence, alliances and stability, if we use it in the wrong way, we will undercut the soft power we need to win. Thus far, intelligence reports that US policies have created more new terrorists than they have destroyed. One of the determinants of the future will be whether the US recovers the ability it once had in the cold war to combine hard and soft power into smart power.

#### AND alliances key to global co-op Kreisher 12 (Otto Kreisher, Former Naval Officer/veteran Washington correspondent and defense journalist, “Chuck Hagel, Touted As Next SecDef, Argues For Soft Power, Allies”, December 10 2012, Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2012/12/10/chuck-hagel-touted-as-next-secdef-argues-for-soft-power-allie/ )

Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its preeminent military position, Hagel argued that “engagement” is the key to address many international problems. In the national security world, engagement generally encompasses negotiations or multinational efforts. It has never been a popular tactic among most Republicans and some pro-military Democrats. However, Hagel insisted that “engagement is not surrender, it’s not appeasement,” clearly taking on some of his GOP colleagues, who have slung around appeasement — associated with the foolish actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he tried to avert war with Germany — to describe some of President Barack Obama’s efforts to prevent international tensions from flaring into conflict. Engagement is “an opportunity to better understand” others, Hagel said, and to bring “mutual self respect” among contesting parties. As the U.S. faces a litany of problems and potential crises in the future, he said, “we will need to turn our receivers on and our transmitters off.” The emerging issues, Hagel said, “are beyond the control of any great power” and the U.S. “cannot solve them alone.” Instead, they must be addressed through alliances, through “joint thinking,” he said.

#### Arctic warming is bringing new diseases-threatens the human population

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013 <http://wwwp.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/06/arctic-disease> Kieran has carried out writing and editing projects for, among others, the World Wildlife Fund ([WWF](http://www.wwf.org.uk/)), the United Nations Environment Programme ([UNEP](http://lightershadeofgreen.com/www.unep.org)) and the Forests and the European Union Research Network ([FERN](http://www.fern.org/))

LONDON – A cow grazing on the lush pasturelands of Cornwall in southwest England and a seal swimming in the ice cold waters of the Arctic might not appear to have much in common.¶ Yet the two are increasingly linked by tuberculosis, with a strain of the disease threatening cattle populations in Britain and elsewhere now showing up among seals in the high Arctic.¶ Claire Heffernan, a veterinarian and a specialist in global health and disease interaction between animals and humans, said that as the climate warms in Arctic regions, more and more diseases from Europe and elsewhere are spreading there, threatening both animal and human populations.¶ "In the past diseases might not have survived in the cold temperatures and the ice of the Arctic but as the region warms a new dynamic is introduced," Heffernan told Climate News Network.¶ "We need to fundamentally alter the way we look at disease in the context of climate change. We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world."

#### And risks biodiversity loss- migration patterns.

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Wide variety of diseases¶ Heffernan, a senior fellow at the Smith School for Enterprise and the Environment in Oxford and director of the livestock development group at the University of Reading, said a wide variety of diseases have recently become evident among Arctic animal populations.¶ Toxoplasma, a parasite common in European cat populations, is now being found in polar bears in Greenland. Erysipelas, a disease of domestic pigs, is being found in musk oxen in the Canadian Arctic: The animals have also been found to have contracted Giardiasis, an intestinal parasite of humans. Meanwhile West Nile virus has been found in wolf pups in the Canadian Arctic Such diseases could have been transmitted in a variety of ways, said Heffernan. The spread of Toxoplasma, for example, might be the result of people flushing cat feces down toilets in the United States and Europe which are then carried by tides to the Arctic. More people are visiting the region. Tourists defecating in the wilds might be the cause of the spread of Erysipelas.¶ "The Arctic is like a Heathrow airport in terms of bird, seal and other migration patterns so that's another way disease is easily spread," said Heffernan. And the disease pathway is not all one way, she added: Pathogens can also be transmitted from the Arctic to elsewhere in the world.

#### **Climate change is releasing new diseases and uncovering old ones in the Arctic- Anthrax, TB, and other ancient diseases**

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013

New disease transmission cycle¶ "The point is no one is really joining up the dots between climate change and the spread of disease," Heffernan said. "There's a whole new disease transmission cycle appearing in the Arctic which we just don't understand."¶ Human disease levels in the Arctic are a continuing concern, she noted. Rates of TB among the Inuit of northern Canada are far higher than in the general populationMajor economic change and development now taking place in the Arctic means previously nomadic people are moving to towns in search jobs. Ice melt is also forcing more into settlements. With people living in close proximity to each other, disease tends to spread faster. Infant mortality in the Arctic, much of it due to diseases curable elsewhere in the world, is considerably higher than elsewhere."In 1930s there was a temperature spike in the Arctic which led to an outbreak of malaria," said Heffernan. "In subsequent years chloroquine was used to combat it. But what happens now, with temperatures rising and the prevalence of chloroquine-resistant malaria?"¶ Early in the last century there were periodic outbreaks of anthrax in the Russian Arctic, resulting in the deaths of thousands of deer and cattle. Some Russian scientists and officials have warned that burial sites of those anthrax infected animals are now being exposed.¶ "As the Arctic melts, ancient pathogens can suddenly escape," Heffernan said. "No one knows for certain how many livestock burial sites there are in the Russian Arctic – I've seen estimates ranging from 400 to 13,000."¶ In recent years there have been several anthrax outbreaks affecting both cattle and people reported in the region, particularly among communities of the indigenous Yakut communities, who often live near to such burial sites.¶ With Arctic temperatures rising at more than twice the rate of the rest of the world, Heffernan said there's an urgent need to link disease and climate change and tackle health issues.

#### **Soft power is crucial to the region- needs common agreements and uniform laws.**

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013**¶**Preventing action¶ But there are a number of problems preventing concerted action: the Arctic is governed by different states with different laws. There's not even a common agreement among Arctic nation states on the region's boundaries. There's a dearth of trained medical staff and research across the region. When it comes to statistics, the Arctic is something of a black hole with health data subsumed into more general country-wide statistics.¶ "There's very little biosecurity work going on in the Arctic," said Heffernan. "We have the means to control so many of these diseases. There must be urgent, concerted, joined-up action."

#### **Russia is at huge risk for favorable disease outbreak- multiple warrants**

Revich et. al ’12 Boris Revich,1,\* [Nikolai Tokarevich](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Tokarevich%20N%5Bauth%5D),2 and [Alan J. Parkinson](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Parkinson%20AJ%5Bauth%5D)3¶ 1Institute of Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia¶ 2Paster Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, Saint-Petersburg, Russia¶ 3Arctic Investigations Program, Division of Preparedness and Emerging Infections, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Alaska, Anchorage, USA 2012 Boris Revich et al http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3417549/

A warming Russian Arctic will be associated with a northward expansion of plants and animal associations including their bacterial viral and parasitic flora. These associations will create favourable conditions for the emergence of infectious diseases in regions that were previously free of these pathogens. Several conclusions can be made regarding the potential emergence of zoonotic infectious diseases and their possible influence on the public health of the population of the Russian Arctic:¶ Monitoring of many zoonotic infectious diseases in the Russian Arctic is insufficient; The Russian Arctic is sparsely populated. Many people live in remote settlements with limited access to medical and public health services. Thus many infectious diseases may go undetected and result in an underestimate of the true rate of infection. Efforts should be made to evaluate and improve existing monitoring systems.¶ There is a need to improve laboratory diagnostics for many of these diseases. The finding suggest the need for improved diagnostics of tick-borne infections.¶ There is a need to educate medical providers, public health officials and the public on the role of climate change in the emergence of zoonotic infectious diseases and prevention strategies that can be used. A warming Arctic may also change social behavioural. In a warmer climate people tend to spend more time outdoors in recreational activities, which increases their contacts with vectors of zoonotic infectious diseases emphasizing the need to educate the population on measures that may prevent their exposure.¶ There is a need to raise awareness of at-risk populations to the potential for infection. These may include hunters and workers in the deer breeding and meat handling industries to the potential of infection from contact with meat, skins, and hides.¶ Anthrax cattle burial sites need to be more carefully monitored, for example, by regular visual check-ups of soil condition and bacteriologic analyses of soil samples.

## Plan

#### Text: The United States federal government should statutorily restrict war powers authority of the President of the United States to authorize targeted killings

## Solvency

#### Congressional authority is key to check mission creep and perpetual war

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. March 24, 2011 "Should the President Have Asked Congress for a Declaration of War Against Libya Before Bombing? No" http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/03/should-the-president-have-asked-congress-for-a-declaration-of-war-against-libya-before-bombing-no James Jay Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.

No one declares war anymore! Not since World War II has any nation declared war on another — with the possible exception of a 1967 declaration against Israel by five Arab countries. While fighting remains as common as ever, the practice of issuing formal declarations has gone out of style.¶ It's not the first time that's happened. Formal declarations of war fell out of fashion during the 17th century, too. Our Founding Fathers thought that was wrong, and so they stuck a requirement in the Constitution saying Congress must approve a declaration before the nation went to war.¶ But that provision was never intended as an absolute check on executive power. Not all military operations constitute wars. Nor is a war declaration the only legitimate way Congress can signal support for military operations.¶ As "The Heritage Guide to the Constitution" points out, there have been only five declared wars in our nation's history, but numerous other hostilities "have been specifically authorized by Congress through instruments other than formal declarations." The framers of the Constitution, however, did think there was something important about "formal" declarations. Democracies, they felt, were fundamentally different from other states and ought to be as open and transparent as possible about what they were doing.¶ War declarations are part of that transparency regimen. When you declare war, you specify your grievances and how you expect to resolve them. That is actually a good practice, and it is too bad democracies have gotten away from it.¶ Yet, clearly, President Barack Obama has the authority to order the current operations in Libya. The Constitution divides the powers of initiating military actions between the executive and Congress to foster deliberation and consultation to the extent possible under the circumstances. But at the end of the day, the president is the commander in chief. He alone bears the legal and moral responsibility for ordering U.S. armed forces into action.¶ What rankles most about the president's decision on Libya is the lack of open deliberation and discussion. Certainly he had time to consult Congress and the American people, yet he spent much more time consulting the U.N. Security Council.¶ It is discomforting to see an American president seemingly defer to the United Nations rather than lead the country. Moreover, the U.N. resolution he got does not help much. The United Nations is not sovereign, nor do we need its permission to act.¶ Furthermore, the resolution is vague and open-ended. And Obama so far has done little to provide clarity about our objectives and our commitment.¶ These are serious concerns. The lack of congressional consultation and the vagueness of the mission deny Americans what the Constitution intended: a clear statement of purpose about U.S. military action. It is vital to avoid "mission creep" and perpetual fighting.¶ All that said, a declaration of war against Libya would be a bad idea, because going to war in Libya is a bad idea. That is not to say that the United States should do nothing, but Libya does not merit significant, protracted operations by U.S. forces.¶ You fight wars to protect vital national interests. The United States has legitimate interests in the outcome of the Libyan turmoil: seeing Gadhafi brought to justice, and not seeing a new terrorist haven established, a humanitarian crisis, or civil war spreading to nearby nations. But these concerns fall short of being vital national interests and can be addressed through measures short of war.¶

#### Mission creep makes intervention inevitable- endless wars justified by liberal internationalism wreck the economy and dilute diplomacy

Gordon N. Bardos May 24, 2013 "A Foreign Policy of Mission Creep"http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/foreign-policy-mission-creep-8514?page=1 Gordon N. Bardos is the assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University.

In an eye-opening article in these spaces a few weeks ago, James Joyner cited the words of an American general in Afghanistan who, in reciting his troops’ successes in Helmand province, noted that "Roads have been paved and markets secured, allowing commerce to grow in places like Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah . . ." Both the general and his troops undoubtedly performed the mission their country gave them professionally and with dedication. But the exchange still begs utterly valid questions: how, when and why did the growth of commerce in Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah become worth American lives or taxpayer dollars? And what might this portend for our potential involvement in Syria? Liberal internationalism, so popular in Washington over the past two decades, has transformed the traditional purpose of American foreign policy—historically understood as systematizing relations between sovereign states and attempting to influence the behavior of other countries—into the much more grandiose attempt to remake the political cultures and economic systems of states and societies thousands of miles from our shores. The result of this transformation of U.S. foreign-policy goals has been what Andrew Bacevich once aptly described as “endless war,” in which the U.S. military is used as an instrument for nation- and state-building in open-ended missions around the world. Consider, as outlined below, the record of some of our recent interventions, and the discrepancy in the time required to achieve their respective military and civilian objectives. Needless to say, long-running interventions cost real money. The post-WWII reconstruction of Germany is estimated to have cost some $35 billion in 2011 dollars. Bosnia after 1995 received more money than any country in Europe under the Marshall Plan. As of April 2013, the United States had spent $60 billion on reconstruction in Iraq and $93 billion in Afghanistan (and as of 2005 Kosovo had received twenty-five times the amount provided to Afghanistan in per capita terms). These amounts do not even include these wars’ financial costs, or their costs in human lives. The enormous discrepancy between achieving the military and civilian objectives of our foreign interventions is intimately connected to the recent Washingtonian vogue for Clausewitz’s conflation of war with politics and diplomacy. Thus, in the 1990s Richard Holbrooke became a proponent of “diplomacy backed by force,” and in a memorable exchange between Madeleine Albright and her UK counterpart in the UN Security Council, Albright claimed that “after all, war is merely an extension of politics by other means.” To which her British colleague replied “Yes, Madeleine, that is exactly what Clausewitz said. But he was a German, and the Germans listened to him. Look what happened to them, twice.” The obvious problem here is that with the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and our increasingly grandiose ambitions abroad, we have gone down an intellectual slippery slope: if war is the equivalent of diplomacy and diplomacy is equal to nation-building, it therefore follows that war is the same as nation-building. This equation perhaps explains why the U.S. Army now has considerably more civil-affairs personnel than the U.S. State Department has foreign-service officers. Unfortunately, our grandiose ambition to effect transformative change in far-off countries has not achieved any notable successes. Consider Washington’s pet project in Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat Federation. After Bosnia’s October 2010 elections, it took some six months for the federation to form a government, which Bosnia’s own Central Electoral Commission then ruled had been formed illegally. Bosnia’s international colonial administration, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), however, suspended the ruling. Some twelve months later, political winds in Bosnia shifted, the questionable government fell apart, and a party in the prior ruling coalition went to the federation’s constitutional court to prevent its cadres from being purged from the new government. Unfortunately, the constitutional court could not rule on the issue, since for the past five years Muslim and Croat parties have been unable to agree on replacing the court’s four missing judges. Many of these problems stem from an internationally approved effort to substitute two Bosnian-Croat parties representing some 90 percent of the Bosnian-Croat electorate with a marginal (but malleable) party which scraped up about two percent of the Croat vote. Unfortunately for the international architects of this plan, even this small party has fallen apart, with a faction loyal to the federation president forming a new microparty. Its chances for success at Bosnia’s next elections seem slim, however, since said federation president has recently been arrested. The divided city of Mostar does not have a functioning legal government because it was unable to hold elections in 2012. The OHR imposed a specific electoral regime on the city in 2004, but its solution to the problem has been ruled unconstitutional. In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia’s current electoral law violates the rights of ethnic minorities to be elected to statewide office, but Muslim and Croat politicians can’t agree on how to amend the constitution. A few months ago, the American ambassador in Sarajevo announced an attempt to reform this chaos, but he is leaving his post in a few weeks. In Iraq, contra Marx’s proposed sequence of events, the farce that has become our Bosnian state-building project is repeated as tragedy. Consider the reality of Iraq in April 2013, a full decade after “mission accomplished” was proclaimed. On April 12, bomb attacks in mosques in Baghdad and Diyala province killed eleven people and wounded 30 more. On April 15, thirty-one people were killed and over two hundred wounded in coordinated bombings in Baghdad, Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk, and Nasiriyah. On April 18, twenty-seven people were killed and dozens more injured in a Baghdad café bombing. On April 23, twenty people were killed in clashes between security forces and anti-government Sunni protesters near Kirkuk. On April 24, seven people were killed and more than twenty injured in a car bombing in the Shia district of al-Husseiniyah near Baghdad. On April 25, ten policemen and thirty gunmen were killed in clashes in Mosul. On April 29, eighteen people were killed and dozens injured after five car bombs went off in Shia-majority provinces in southern Iraq. All told, surveying the nation-building achievements of our foreign policy over the past couple of decades is not encouraging. Last summer, seventeen years after the ostensible end of the Bosnian conflict, a local politician told his constituents “The war is not over. We are still fighting the same war.” Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki recently warned that Iraq is in danger of returning to “sectarian war,” and notwithstanding Donald Rumsfeld’s view that “freedom is untidy” and “stuff happens,” an Iraq on the cusp of civil war under increasing Iranian influence is not where the country was supposed to be ten years after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And in Afghanistan, by this time next year there is a good chance the Taliban will again be calling the shots. The lessons of recent decades suggest that American military might can probably (at least eventually) remove Assad from power, but there is precious little historical evidence to show that we can substantively shape the end-state in Syria—the “end-state” here being understood as the six to twelve months after the Washington war lobby and the media lose interest and move on to some more fashionable crisis. President Obama’s inability to get four senators from his own party to vote for gun reform is a stark, telling reminder of the limits of U.S. power, executive and otherwise. Against Clausewitz and his latter-day enthusiasts, the late scholar of international relations Edwin Fedder frequently noted that if you have to resort to military force, your diplomacy has already failed. As the Obama administration debates the pros and cons of intervening in Syria, understanding the differences between diplomacy, waging war and nation-building become more urgent—as does developing a realistic appreciation for what military intervention can and cannot achieve.

#### Restricting the AUMF solves inevitable warfare- creates structural checks to a riskless system

BENJAMIN H. FRIEDMAN JUNE 19, 2012 "Drones, Special Operations, and Whimsical Wars" http://www.cato.org/blog/drones-special-operations-whimsical-wars Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. His areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, homeland security and defense politics.

Asked the last week on 60 Minutes how many shooting wars the United States is in, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta took a moment to answer. He eventually said we are going after al Qaeda in Pakistan and its “nodes” in Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa. Somehow, he left out the indefinite war we have going in Afghanistan. It’s no wonder that Panetta can’t keep track of the wars he’s supposed to manage. On top of Afghanistan and the drone campaigns, 12,000 U.S. special operations forces are distributed around dozens of countries, increasingly outside declared war zones, where they train foreign militaries, collect intelligence, and occasionally launch lethal raids. As just reported in the Washington Post, some of these forces are now operating a dozen bases across Northern Africa, where their activities include overseeing contractors flying surveillance aircraft. Despite the Obama administration’s claims of great progress in fighting al Qaeda, the global shadow war shows no signs of abating. The official rationale for using force across the world is that al Qaeda is global. But that’s true only thanks to a capacious definition of al Qaeda that imposes a sense of false unity of disparate groups. The always-overrated remnant of the organization that sponsored the 9/11 attacks barely exists anymore, even in Pakistan. Our counterterrorism efforts are directed mostly against others: terrorists that take up al Qaeda’s name and desire to kill westerners but have limited links to the real McCoy, as in Yemen and North Africa, and insurgents friendly to jihadists but mostly consumed by local disputes, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Shabaab in Somalia, and al Qaeda’s Islamist allies in southern Yemen. Like the phony Communist monolith in the Cold War, the myth of a unified, global “al Qaeda” makes actions against vaguely-linked entities—many with no obvious interest in the United States—seem like a coherent campaign against globe trotting menace bent on our destruction. The real reason we are fighting so much these days is that war is too easy. International and domestic restraints on the use of U.S. military power are few. And unrestrained power tends to be exercised. Presidents can use it whimsically, at least until they do something costly that creates a backlash and wakes up public opposition. Drones and special operations forces made this problem worse. Most of the world is what the military calls a permissive environment, especially since the end of the Cold War. Most places lack forces capable of keeping our military out. Many potential allies invite it. The risks traditionally associated with war—invasion, mass death, etc.—are now alien to Americans. Since the draft ended, the consequences of even bad wars for most of us are minor: unsettling media stories and mildly higher taxes deferred by deficits. That’s why, as Nuno Monteiro argues, the U.S. military was already quite busy in the 1990s despite the absence of real enemies. Because war is so cheap, the public has little reason to worry much about it. That leaves elected representatives without any electoral incentive to restrain presidential war powers. No surprise then that the imperial presidency grew as American power did. Technology gains and secrecy exacerbate the problem. Even more than strategic bombing from high altitude, which already prevented U.S. casualties, drones cheapen warfare. Covert raids are riskier, of course, but secrecy limits public appreciation of those risks. The president and his advisors assure us that they use these forces only after solemn debate and nights spent (badly) reading just war theory. But a White House that debates the use of force only with itself short-circuits the democratic process. That is not just a constitutional problem but a practical one. Broad debate among competing powers generally produces better decisions than narrower, unilateral ones. That is why is it is naïve to suggest, as John Fabian Witt did last week in a New York Times op-ed, that the executive branch is developing sensible legal institutions to manage the gray area between war and peace occupied by drone strikes. What’s needed are checks and balances. That means Congress needs to use its war powers. First, Congress should rewrite the 2001 Authorization of Military Force, which has morphed into a legal rationale for doing whatever presidents want in the name of counterterrorism. That bill authorized force against the organizers of the September 11 attacks and those who aided them, which seemed to mean al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan. The new law should state that acts of war, including drone strikes, in other places require a new authorization of force. If Congress is for bombing stuff in Yemen and Somalia, it should debate those missions. Second, Congress should reform the convoluted laws governing the deployment of special operations forces, making their use more onerous and transparent. Those forces should engage in covert action only after a presidential finding, as with the CIA. Third, Congress should require that taxes or offsets fund wars. That would increase debate about their worth. The trouble, as already noted, is that Congress has no interest in doing these things. Congressional leaders are today more interested in policing leaks about the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers than in restraining them. Short of a military disaster involving special operations forces or drones, this seems unlikely to change in the short term. In the longer term, we need a restoration of Congress’ institutional identity. Even without an electoral reason, politicians should want to exercise war powers simply because they can—because people like power. That’s the assumption behind Edward Corwin’s notion that the constitution’s is an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Something has obstructed Congress’ desire to struggle. Those concerned by the president’s promiscuous use of force should try to identify and remove the obstruction.

#### US needs to alter law to be a first mover – international responses to drone proliferation crumble without domestic accountability- restores US cred.

Alston 2011 (Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 2) PY

It might be argued in response by the United States that the standard of accountability required is lower in relation to non-international armed conflicts, which is how the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be categorized by most observers. This lower standard might be said to be evidenced by the fact that states are not obligated to give full access to the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") in such conflicts. But the ICRC's review of customary law makes it abundantly clear that the obligation to ensure accountability applies fully in both international and non-international armed conflicts. This is based on military manuals, including that of the United States, explicit state practice, requirements imposed by the Security Council, and norms endorsed by a range of other international bodies. n88¶ For its part, IHRL, developed by a wide range of international and regional institutions, and reflected in customary law principles, places a particular emphasis on the obligation of states to investigate, prosecute, and punish any alleged violation of the norms banning extrajudicial executions. United States officials, as well as some American commentators, have tended to assume that the duty to investigate alleged violations of the right to life, a duty that has been elaborated upon at length in the jurisprudence of bodies such as the Human Rights Committee n89 and the European Court [\*313] of Human Rights, flows only from specific treaty obligations. n90 By noting that the United States is not a party to the European Convention, and by arguing that the ICCPR does not obligate the United States extraterritorially, n91 they assume that the well-developed jurisprudence emanating from these two bodies has no relevance in determining the United States' obligations in relation to a practice such as extraterritorial targeted killings. Leaving aside the contentious debates over the extraterritorial nature of ICCPR obligations, this approach incorrectly assumes that the duty to investigate killings has no existence in customary international law, independent of treaty obligations. The right to life has long been acknowledged as part of custom, and a duty to investigate has long been assumed to be a central part of that norm, not least by the United States when it consistently calls upon other governments to investigate killings without invoking any specific treaty-based obligations binding upon the governments concerned. n94¶ [\*314] Customary and treaty-based obligations to investigate alleged violations of the right to life can only be met if states accept the need for a degree of transparency which makes it possible to satisfy the obligations to ensure accountability. In explaining what human rights law requires, the European Court of Human Rights has long insisted that "[t]here must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities' adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts." n95 In the same context, the Court has made it clear that there is no single formula by which this is to be achieved, by acknowledging that "[t]he degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case." n96¶ There is thus compelling evidence that both applicable bodies of law require transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, in view of the tendency of those advocating the use of targeted killings to suggest that counter-terrorism requires different rules or that intelligence agencies must operate on a different basis, it is appropriate to consider whether there are circumstances that would warrant the adoption of significantly less demanding standards of accountability. In relation to terrorism, it is often argued that there are unavoidable tradeoffs between security and respect for human rights as well as between security and transparency. In other words, secrecy and limits on rights are part of the price that must be paid for security in a world subject to terrorist threats. While these claims have been thoroughly canvassed in other contexts n97 they call for two particular responses in the present setting. The first is to acknowledge that, in relation [\*315] to targeted killing operations, there are major security and effectiveness concerns that require a strong element of secrecy, rather than disclosure. For example, disclosing the identity of an intelligence source or putting an informant at risk of retaliation will limit the extent to which the information justifying a given targeting decision can be publicly divulged. Similarly, it might be argued that significant disclosure would eliminate the fear or uncertainty factor that is designed to constrain the activities of groups who might conclude from published criteria that they were unlikely to be subject to drone attacks. n98 There will thus be certain limits as to how much transparency can be required.¶ The second response to the argument about necessary tradeoffs is that "security" in this context must be interpreted not only as a goal in itself, but also as a means by which to protect the fundamental values of human rights and democracy. n99 There can thus be no question of simply trading off one value against the other, or of assuming that constraining freedoms increases security. In rejecting what he evocatively describes as the "hydraulic liberty-security metaphor," n100 Stephen Holmes argues that there are in fact many ways in which respect for liberty contributes to enhanced security. While others have also stressed the importance of empirical justifications favoring a degree of transparency on the part of the CIA and other intelligence actors, n101 Holmes invokes what are essentially prudential and efficiency based reasons in support of what he terms "rule-governed counterterrorism." They include the efficiency-enhancing effect of being forced to give reasons for decisions, the greater likelihood that visceral and punitive reactions--which can generally be assumed to be inefficient--will be constrained by following accepted guidelines, the need [\*316] to expose groups of like-minded decision-makers to counter-arguments coming from other perspectives, and the need to deter official reliance on claims of an emergency in order to avoid scrutiny. n102¶ The other argument that suggests the appropriateness of less demanding standards of accountability relates to the special situation of intelligence agencies. In response, it is appropriate to acknowledge the deep tensions between the need for accountability and the inherent bias of such agencies towards unaccountability. It is clearly paradoxical to be seeking transparency and encouraging information sharing from agents whose very existence is premised on secrecy and absolute discretion. The need for intelligence services to be accountable has always been strong simply because of the power that they exercise and the otherwise unlimited potential for abuse of that power. But over the past decade the importance of accountability has grown dramatically for various reasons. Reaction to the events of 9/11 placed intelligence agencies at the forefront of efforts to combat terrorism and put a premium on rapid action, efficiency, and the exercise of only very loosely constrained agency discretion, often at the expense of transparency, respect for human rights, and meaningful congressional consultation. Agency personnel numbers and budgets increased greatly, special operations became far more common, and double-hatting served to make scrutiny more difficult. In addition, joint operations as well as intelligence-sharing with foreign counterpart agencies, often working for authoritarian regimes, became widespread and increased the likelihood of human rights abuses occurring. n103¶ But the challenges to accountability have also multiplied since 9/11. In an age of enhanced global terror operations the structural predisposition to secrecy on the part of intelligence officials has only been strengthened. The heterogeneity and geographical spread of actual and potential terrorist groups, the reality of homegrown terror, and the potential for large-scale acts of terrorism, have all contributed to support for secrecy. This goes beyond the mere need to ensure operational secrecy. Intelligence agencies cannot operate in a traditional hierarchical fashion for fear that a leak at one point in the chain of command will undermine the entire operation. Individual officers are thus given considerable discretion and even relative [\*317] autonomy according to the circumstances. Moreover, the centrality of the notion of "plausible deniability" means that such agencies are often required to act in ways that not only leave no fingerprints, but also leave (almost) no internal paper trail. These factors in turn make the agency less disposed towards, and less accessible to, either internal or external oversight. But the response is not to reinforce these pathological tendencies, but rather to reassert the primacy of IHRL and IHL standards and thus the need for appropriate levels of transparency and accountability, albeit tailored to reflect the legitimate exigencies faced by such actors.¶ Before moving to consider the Obama administration's approach to these issues, it is important to underscore the fact that we are talking about two different levels of accountability. The first is that national procedures must meet certain standards of transparency and accountability in order to meet existing international obligations. The second is that the national procedures must themselves be sufficiently transparent to international bodies as to permit the latter to make their own assessment of the extent to which the state concerned is in compliance with its obligations. In other words, even in situations in which states argue that they put in place highly impartial and reliable accountability mechanisms, the international community cannot be expected to take such assurances on the basis of faith rather than of convincing information. Assurances offered by other states accused of transgressing international standards would not be accepted by the United States in the absence of sufficient information upon the basis of which some form of verification is feasible. Since the 1980s, the phrase "trust but verify" n104 has been something of a mantra in the arms control field, but it is equally applicable in relation to IHL and IHRL. The United States has consistently demanded of other states that they demonstrate to the international community the extent of their compliance with international standards. A great many examples could be cited, not only from the annual State Department reports on the human rights practices of other states, but also from a range of statements by the President and the Secretary of State in relation to countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria in the context of the Arab Spring of 2011.

#### Squo drone strategy unsustainable--- host-state and domestic backlash--- plan solves and establishes global norms for drone use

 Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at CFR, previously worked at Harvard Kennedy School and State Department, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR Special Report No 56)

Over the past decade, the use of unmanned aerial systems—commonly referred to as drones—by the U.S. government has expanded exponentially in scope, location, and frequency.1 From September 2001 to April 2012, the U.S. military increased its drone inventory from fifty to seventy-five hundred—of which approximately 5 percent can be armed.2 Yet despite the unprecedented escalation of its fleet and mis- sions, the U.S. government has not provided a clear explanation of how drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings are coordinated with broader foreign policy objectives, the scope of legitimate targets, and the legal framework. Drones are critical counterterrorism tools that advance U.S. interests around the globe, but this lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework.

Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are likely to grow over time. The first comes from operational restrictions on drones due to domestic and international pressure. In the United States, the public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited transparency for targeted killings.3 If the present trajectory continues, drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality of which eventually caused the policy’s demise. Internationally, objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners could also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by nonhost partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones. Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself helped estab- lish, and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation.

3 The second major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this capability. The advantages and effectiveness of drones in attacking hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are com- pelling many countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy pro- vides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications. Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the international community to shape norms for responsible drone use.

The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity. Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings by ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting tar- geted killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and individuals with direct involvement in past or ongoing plots against the United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Given that the United States is currently the only country—other than the United Kingdom in the tra- ditional battlefield of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use of drones.

# 2AC

### Afro-Pess

#### Role of the ballot is to evaluate desirability of the plan’s implications: neg must prove the plan is worse than the status quo or offer a competitive counter advocacy.

#### This interpretation is best:

#### Most predictable—grounded in the resolution

#### Alternative frameworks are infinite makes aff win impossible.

#### Perm both

#### Policy focus is key to challenge structures of white supremacy.

Makani Themba-Nixon, 7-31-2000, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy, Makani, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2

 “This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our box.

#### Perm do the plan and the alt in every other instance

#### Frontal assaults on whiteness can’t unseat racist systems of thought- Categorically rejected by the adaptive unconscious

Berklak 2009 (Ann Berlak, Elementary Education Program, San Fransisco State University, 2009, “Challenging the Hegemony of Whiteness by Addressing the Adaptive Unconscious,” in Undoing Whiteness in the Classroom)

 (p50-1) The theory of the adaptive unconscious they set out suggested a new way to think about making the power and privilege of whiteness visible. The central idea of the theory is that we have two non-redundant information processing systems that are relatively independent of one another. These two systems have evolved in different ways and serve different functions. One of these, the adaptive unconscious, operates almost entirely out of conscious view. The adaptive unconscious is far more sophisticated, efficient, and adult-like than the unconscious portrayed by psychoanalytic theory. It can set goals, interpret and evaluate evidence, and influence judgments, conscious feelings, and behavior. People can think in quite sophisticated ways and yet be thinking "non-consciously." In fact, the mind relegates a good deal of high-level thinking to the adaptive unconscious. Wilson calls it the adaptive unconscious because it has evolved to enable human survival. It permits us to notice danger and respond to it quickly. Gladwell compares the adaptive unconscious to a giant computer that crunches all the data from all the experiences we have had. These efficient, sophisticated, unconscious information-processing systems that select, interpret, and evaluate incoming information, direct our attention, and filter our experience influence almost all our second-by-second responses. Thus, the adaptive unconscious is more influential in our day-by-day living than most of us think, and we exert less control over our actions than we imagine. Attitudes toward concepts such as race or gender, for example, operate at two levels—at a conscious level our stated values direct our behavior deliberately, and at an unconscious level we respond in terms of immediate but quite complex automatic associations that tumble out before we have even had time to think. The adaptive unconscious is unintentional, effortless, and responsive to the here and now. It is also rigid; that is, it is slow to respond to new and contradictory information. Conscious thought takes a longer view; it is controlled, slow, and effortful. The idea is that we have two personality systems: the adaptive unconscious and the conscious self. As exemplified by Katie, each has characteristic and sometimes diametrically opposed ways of interpreting the environment and its own feelings and motives that guide behavior. Many studies have documented that the disconnect between the conscious intentions of people like Katie and the unconscious views that motivate their behavior is ubiquitous (e.g. Ferguson, 2000; Lewis, 2004). So independent are the two systems that Gladwell characterizes the snap judgments or rapid cognitions characteristic of the adaptive unconscious as taking place behind a locked door. Thus, individuals can honestly claim they are aware of the diverse set of racist practices that hold in place the hegemony of whiteness and yet be completely unaware of them at an implicit automatic level. People may act on their conscious views when they are behaving deliberately but act on the more unconscious dispositions of their adaptive unconscious when they are not monitoring their actions.

**Perm every non competitive instance**

#### Instead, adaptive unconscious reactions trigger the worst forms of racial abuse

Berklak 2009 (Ann Berlak, Elementary Education Program, San Fransisco State University, 2009, “Challenging the Hegemony of Whiteness by Addressing the Adaptive Unconscious,” in Undoing Whiteness in the Classroom)

(p53) Acting in response to the adaptive unconscious can of course be dangerous and damaging both to oneself and to others; the adaptive unconscious can betray us as it did Katie. It can countermand conscious rational processes of thinking, jump to conclusions, and fail to change in the face of contrary evidence. It is responsible for some of society's most troubling problems. Much research in cognitive psychology has been concerned with the implications of non-conscious processing for racial prejudice and white racism. Some of these studies show that, particularly when under time pressure or facing anxiety-provoking situations, people do not rely on the evidence of their senses and fall back on the rigid, unyielding categorical stereotypes that inhabit their adaptive unconscious. That four police officers, "thinking" he was about to shoot them, decimated the dark-skinned Amadou Diallo with a total of 41 bullets as he reached into his pocket to locate identification papers one winter night in the South Bronx is evidence of the potential destructiveness of the racial lenses of the adaptive unconscious.

#### Whiteness cant be the root cause- history of other races justifying violence based on racialization

Spickard 2009 Paul Spickard, Graduated Harvard, Ph.D in History from UC Berkeley, professor of history at UC Santa Barbara, review of “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, in American Studies, vol 5 num 1/2, MUSE

For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment.

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Anti-blackness doesn’t cause social death or predetermine subjectivity- their arg is backwards

Brown 2009 (Vincent Brown, Professor of History and of African and African-American¶ Studies at Harvard University. December 2009, ¶ AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

Like scholars of resistance before him, Rucker effectively refutes any contention that the enslaved were socially dead. At the same time, his focus on the making of African American culture obscures a crucial dimension of the politics of slavery. In The River Flows On, resistance is the expression of culture, and peoplehood is the outcome of resistance, but Rucker places much less emphasis on the kinds of existential problems highlighted by Hartman and Smallwood. He does not ignore the violence of slavery, but he invokes bondage and its depredations as the antithesis of black self-making, rather than as a constitutive part of it. If for Hartman dispossession “had made us an us,” Rucker believes that resistance was the crucible in which black people forged identity from a vital inheritance. 41 How might his approach account for the dislocations, physical violations, and cosmic crises that preoccupy Hartman and Smallwood? Here is where scholars of retention and resistance may yet have something to learn from the concept of social death, viewed properly as a compelling metaphysical threat. African American history has grown from the kinds of people’s histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved depend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study. 42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken “agency,” or the self-willed activity of choice-making subjects, to be their starting point. 43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would ﬁnd themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been “pictured principally as a negative or limiting force” that “restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.”44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery’s corrosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assumption. However, the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activity—a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence.

#### Totalizing critiques of whiteness commodify races- essentialisms ensure no alt solvency

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, fromracialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

#### Wildersons argument denies black agency and fails to come up with effective solutions.

Saër Maty Ba, September 2011, Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor – The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation,” Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), p. 385-87

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s blackassocialdeath idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the filmastextaslegitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navelgazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the interconnectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the UScentricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazzstudies books on crosscultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

### Risk

#### That schol inev-perm do both is part of solution

#### Exceptional catalysts control direction of systemic risks—our internal links are the sufficient provocations for underlying conditions—ignorance commits to the impacts

Lebow 2k (Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change, Richard Ned Lebow director of the Mershon Center and professor of political science, history, and psy- chology at Ohio State University Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 591-616 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657611>.)

Wars, revolutions, and depressions change the world and the way in which we think about it. World War I was a seminal event in both respects. It ushered in a profound transformation of the international system, and is de- scribed by many historians as the crucible in which the twentieth century was shaped. It has also been a critical case for the generation and testing of theories about conflict and international relations more generally. Many historians contend that World War I-or something like it-would have been very hard, if not impossible, to avoid. The distinguished British histo- rian, F. H. Hinsley, insisted, "If the Sarajevo crisis had not precipitated a partic- ular great war, some other crisis would have precipitated a great war at no dis- tant date."1 Neorealists and power transition theorists make similar claims, albeit for different reasons.2 I do not doubt that many, perhaps most of the causes of war in 1914 that historians and political scientists have identified cre- ated a conflict-prone environment. But underlying causes, no matter how nu- merous or deep-seated, do not make an event inevitable. Their consequences may depend on fortuitous coincidences in timing and on the presence of cata- lysts that are independent of any of the underlying causes. World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent in both its underly- ing and immediate causes. Historians have proposed a variety of underlying causes for World War I, including social Darwinism, nationalism, the alliance structure, and shifts in the balance of power. I argue that what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of alleged causes, but rather the interactions among them. World War I is best understood as a nonlinear confluence of three largely independent chains of causation, which produced independent but more or less simultaneous gestalt shifts in Vienna and Berlin, and a slightly ear- lier one in Russia. Had the timing of the Austrian and German shifts been off by as little as two years, Austrian leaders would not have felt so intent on de- stroying Serbia, or German leaders would not have been so willing to encour- age them to do so. For this reason alone, World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent. Theoretical explanations for war take catalysts for granted. If the right un- derlying conditions are present, some incident will sooner or later set armies on the march in the way the twin assassinations in Sarajevo did in 1914. But Sarajevo was not just any provocation; it met a diverse set of political and psy- chological requirements that were essential for Austrian and German leaders to risk war. It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that some other provocation would have met these conditions or that some other combination of great pow- ers would have started a war for different reasons. In the absence of a catalyst, several more years of peace could have altered the strategic and domestic con- texts of the great powers and made war less likely. There was a two-year win- dow when the leaders of at least two great powers thought their national or dynastic interests were better served by war than peace. Social scientists often assume that major social and political developments are specific instances of strong or even weak regularities in social behavior. But these developments may be the result of accidental conjunctures. Conversely, events that seem highly likely may never happen. The concatenation of particular leaders with particular contexts, and of particular events with other events is always a matter of chance, never of necessity.3 My findings have important implications for the study of international sys- tem change, by which I mean a change in the polarity of the system or the rules by which it operates. They suggest that system transformations-and many other kinds of international events-are unpredictable because their underly- ing causes do nothing more than create the possibility of change. Actual change depends upon contingency, catalysts, and actors. Neither contingency nor cata- lysts have been analyzed systematically by social scientists, and I offer some thoughts about how this might be done. There is a large literature on actors, most of it based on the premise that they are instrumentally rational. A striking finding of the World War I case and of the two other system transformations of the twentieth century-World War II and the end of the cold war-is the extent to which the behavior that brought about these transformations was based on extreme miscalculations. Such behavior may not be the norm in every- day foreign policy decision making, but it may be characteristic of the decisions that unwittingly usher in system transformations. The first two stages of my inquiry make use of counterfactual thought ex- periments.4 Counterfactuals are past conditionals or, more colloquially, "what if" statements about the past. They alter some aspect of the past (doing away with a person or event, changing a critical decision or outcome, inserting an event or development that never happened, or making it take place sooner or later than it did) to set the stage for a "what might have been" argument. I use only "minimal rewrite" counterfactuals. They entail small, plausible changes in reality that do not violate our understanding of what was technologically, culturally, temporally, or otherwise possible.5 A world in which Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife returned alive from their 1914 visit to Sarajevo is an example. Gavrilo Princip's accomplice missed killing the royals in their procession to city hall. Princip was lamenting his failure when the touring car carrying Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie came to a stop to allow the cars at the head of the procession to back up because they had made a wrong turn. With only a minimal rewrite of history, the procession stays on the planned route, and the assassination is averted. Such a rewrite does not strain our under- standing of the world, because most twentieth-century royal processions follow their intended routes. The archduke's was an exception.

#### We solve the K without succumbing to their structural determinism—forward reasoning evaluates variable causal interactions to find relative value

Lebow 7 (Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International relations, 2007, p. 145-6)

Scenarios make contingent claims rather than point predictions. They reinsert a sensible notion of contingency into theoretical arguments that would otherwise tend toward determinism. Scholars in international relations tend to privilege arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. The field also favors variables that are structural or otherwise parametric, thus downplaying the role of both agency and accident. Forward reasoning under­cuts structural determinism by raising the possibility and plausibility of multiple futures. Scenarios are impressionistic pictures that build on different combinations of causal variables that may also take on different values in different scenarios. Thus it is possible to construct scenarios without pre-existing firm proof of theoretical claims that meet strict positivist standards. The foundation for scenarios is made up of provisional assumptions and causal claims. These become the subject of revision and updating more than testing. A set of scenarios often contains com­peting or at least contrasting assumptions. It is less important where people start. than it is where they are through frequent revisions, and how they got there. A good scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis about how the future might unfold; it is a chain of logic that connects "drivers" to outcomes. Consider as an example one plausible scenario at the level of a "global future" where power continues to shift away from the state and toward international institutions, trans-national actors, and local communities. The state loses its monopoly on the provision of security and basic characteristics of the Westphalian system as we have known it are fundamentally altered. In this setting, key decisions about security, economics and culture will be made by nonstate actors. Security may become a commodity that can be bought like other commodities in the global marketplace. A detailed scenario about this transformation would specify the range of changes that are expected to occur and how they are connected to one another. It would identify what kinds of evidence might support the scenario as these or other processes unfold over the next decade, and what kind of evidence would count against the scenario or indicate a branching off point. Moreover, evidence that counts against one scenario, might count for another. Evaluations of evidence as events unfolded would then determine which scenario appeared to be playing out, or whether the same scenario had started to evolve in unanticipated directions. The same drivers could be at play in multiple scenarios, but how changes in technology, human agency, and transnational networks interact is less certain and these interactions can lead outcomes along very different trajectories. This method is simply a form of process tracing, or increasing the number of observable implications of an argument, in future rather than past time. Eventually, as in the heuristics of evolutionary biology, future history becomes data. But instead of thinking of data as something that can falsify any particular hypothesis, we need to think of it as something capable distinguishing or selecting the story that was from stories that might have been. Such storylines are not linear, but as contingent in a way our scenario methodology tries to capture. A central choice in developing scenarios is whether to begin with drivers—the "causal forces" or the plot line in the story—or the outcomes or resolution of the stories. There are several reasons to start with drivers. From the perspective of traditional social science, it is cleaner in principle to reason from cause to effect when possible. Pragmatically, scenario thinkers are more likely to generate results that contain surprises or challenging combinations of events when they begin from beliefs or ideas about fundamental causes, rather than from preconceived notions of the most likely outcome states. People who work on particular problems and have done so for a long time typically carry around in their heads a set of plausible outcomes, or "official futures," that they believe are likely and relevant to their concerns. One of the purposes of constructing scenarios is to encourage scholars and experts to think outside of these confines about plausible, different futures. In summary, scenario thinking is disciplined by beginning with the identification of the several factors (causes), which scholars believe are most important to the future of a political relationship. They can then distinguish between what is most certain and what is most uncertain. Uncertainty in this context can mean that scholars are uncertain about the 'value' of the variable, or about the causal impact of the variable, or both. The three or four most important, uncertain causes can then be identified, as well as a narrative explication of the **key uncertainties** at play and the nature of their possible interactions. These critical uncertainties become the basis of different plot lines. By assigning different "values" to these variables, and combining them in different ways, scholars can reason to a set of plausible end-states. These end-states should be plausible within existing conceptual frameworks, but, when possible, challenging to "official futures." Scholar-can then develop the narrative pathways that could generate the outcomes by moving from a highly abstract framework toward increasingly precise—and compelling—causal stories that specify assumptions, major drivers, limiting conditions, and implications. As part of these narratives, scholars must specify the trends that weave through their stories, and can be monitored as time passes. Rather than prediction, laying out such a scenario and its alternatives encourages students of international affairs to consider a range of drivers, to identify the critical uncertainties, to develop different plot lines by varying these uncertainties, and to develop indicators of different paths to monitor trends as they unfold. Just as counterfactual analysis is a useful tool for evaluating the strength of competing explanations and recognizing the contingency of outcomes that actually occurred, forward reasoning opens our analyses to the possibilities of alternative futures, but forces discipline in tracing likely paths created by important drivers in combination with significant uncertainties. Perhaps the most important contribution forward reasoning can make to international relations is to confront us repeatedly with surprises. Whatever theories or suppositions guide scenario generation, our expectations will be frequently, if not regularly, confounded given the power of agency and the open nature of all social systems. Discrepant outcomes can always be explained away or somehow made consistent with existing theories of international relations—as with realism and the end of the Cold War—by various conceptual sleights of hand. Forward reasoning actively seeks to rebut its own expectations, and considers discrepant information as valuable as confirming information. Such an approach, if it does nothing else, encourages openness and humility, both of which are currently in very short supply in our discipline.

#### Targeted policy solves

Suteanu 5 (Complexity, Science and the Public : The Geography of a New Interpretation Cristian Suteanu Department of Geography & Environmental Studies Program Saint Mary’s U. Theory Culture Society 2005 22: 113 http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/22/5/113)

Learning about Prediction and Control It is precisely the advancement in complexity, both in its conceptual framework and in its methodology, which provides powerful tools to cope with the ‘wild’ dynamics of complex systems (Sornette, 2000). And yet, here lies also the source of insights concerning limits in our capability to make predictions. The lesson of the Lyapunov exponent mentioned above (in the subsection, ‘“To Be Reproducible”: Admitting Uniqueness’) means that complex dynamic systems may pose information-related obstacles to interaction with them. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and perturbations affects one’s capacity to predict their behaviour. The degree of predictability does not depend exclusively on technological limits, which means that it does not change to suit the rhythm of technological progress: in the case of chaotic systems, we have to multiply our technological effort many times over to reach only moderately enhanced results, and these enhancements weaken fast when we go further in time. This is not to say that signiﬁcant progress with respect to dynamic system prediction has not been made or will not be made in the future, nor does it suggest that there are limits to achievable progress. However, this problem points to profound sources of constraints regarding predictability. For the public, an inevitable implication is that science really has a problem: it will never be able to predict accurately the dynamic behaviour of chaotic systems. In fact, instead of an expected breakthrough in this domain, science has provided proof that its ‘failure’ has solid foundations. The feeling of vulnerability can only be enhanced thereby. If prediction is such a challenging problem, what can be expected in terms of control? The answer here is not quite so negative. Based on principles of complexity, the resourcefulness of scholars has led to methods of what is called ‘chaos control’ (Ott et al., 1990). The idea is that if the system is unstable, and you know when, where and how to act upon it, you can guide or control it, using very little energy to do so. Instead of a large amount of energy, you need information. Spectacular technological applications have already begun to emerge (Boccaletti et al., 2000).

#### Robust statistics validate our impacts – prefer them over their polemics

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline

Wendt**,** Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.